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For decades, agricultural price and trade policies in Sub-Saharan Africa hampered 
farmers’ contributions to economic growth and poverty reduction. While there has 
been much policy reform over the past two decades, the injections of agricultural 
development funding, together with on-going regional and global trade negotiations, 
have brought distortionary policies under the spotlight once again. A key question 
asked of those policies is: how much are they still reducing national economic welfare 
and trade? Economy-wide models are able to address that question, but they are not 
available for many poor countries. Even where they are, typically they apply to just 
one particular previous year and so are unable to provide trends in effects over time. 
This paper provides a partial-equilibrium alternative to economy-wide modelling, by 
drawing on a modification of so-called trade restrictiveness indexes to provide 
theoretically precise indicators of the trade and welfare effects of agricultural policy 
distortions to producer and consumer prices over the past half-century. We generate 
time series of country level indices, as well as Africa-wide aggregates. We also 
provide annual commodity market indices for the region, and we provide a sense of 
the relative importance of the key policy instruments used.  
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Agricultural Distortions in Sub-Saharan Africa: 






In the 1960s and 1970s, governments of many Sub-Saharan African countries adopted 
macroeconomic, sectoral, trade and exchange rate policies that directly or indirectly 
taxed farm households seeking to export their way out of poverty. This anti-
agricultural, anti-trade, welfare-reducing policy stance, which was also prevalent in 
numerous other developing country regions up to the early 1980s (Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes 1988), has since begun to be reformed. How far has that reform effort gone in 
altering the trade- and welfare-reducing characteristics of farm and food policies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa? This matters greatly for economic development and poverty 
alleviation, because 60 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s workforce is still employed in 
agriculture, nearly 40 percent of the population is earning less than $1/day, and more 
than 80 percent of the region’s poorest households depend directly or indirectly on 
farming for their livelihoods (World Bank 2007, Chen and Ravallion 2008). 
   There are important questions to be addressed about future agricultural policy 
reform in Africa because African agriculture is currently the subject of several new 
agricultural development assistance programs, as well as being important in on-going 
multilateral and preferential trade negotiations. A first step in considering possible 
future policies is to examine the impacts of past policy choices, and in particular to 
ask by how much are the policies still reducing national economic welfare and trade?  4 
 
Economy-wide models are able to address that question, but such models are 
not available for many of Africa’s poorer countries. Even where they are, typically 
they depend on myriad assumptions about parameter (for lack of econometric 
estimates) and they apply to just one particular previous year and so are unable to 
provide trends in effects over time.  
This paper provides a partial-equilibrium alternative to economy-wide 
modelling, by drawing on a modification of so-called trade restrictiveness indexes to 
provide theoretically precise indicators of the trade and welfare effects of agricultural 
policy distortions to producer and consumer prices. By drawing on a recent 
comprehensive database covering most of Sub-Saharan African agriculture, we 
generate annual country level indices for the past half-century, as well as region-wide 
aggregates including for individual commodities and a sense of the relative 
importance of the key policy instruments used. In doing so we make a methodological 
advance by incorporating a number of key nontradable products in our estimates of 
the indices, which turns out to be important in the African agricultural policy context. 
Data for construction of the indices come from the World Bank’s Distortions 
to Agricultural Incentives database (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). The database 
gives consistent measures of price-distorting policies for 75 countries for the period 
1955 to 2007. The data for the 21 African countries in that database is discussed 
comprehensively in Anderson and Masters (2009). In this paper we focus on 19 of 
those African countries, leaving aside Egypt and South Africa because they are both 
large and very different from the others. That sample comprises five countries of 
eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda), four in southern 
Africa (Madagascar, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), five large economies in 
Africa’s western coast (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal), and 5 
 
five smaller economies of West and Central Africa for which cotton is a crucial export 
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Togo). We concentrate on the period 1961 to 
2004, since those are the years for which the African data are most complete.  
This paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the methodology 
we use. This is followed by a discussion of the data in the World Bank’s Agricultural 
Distortions database. We then report our estimates of the series of indices before 




There is a growing literature that identifies ways to measure the trade- and welfare-
reducing effects of international trade-related policies in scalar index numbers. This 
literature serves a key purpose: it overcomes aggregation problems (across different 
intervention measures and across industries) by using a theoretically sound 
aggregation procedure to answer precise questions regarding the trade or welfare 
reductions imposed by each country’s trade policies.  
These measures represent a substantial improvement on commonly used 
measures. The usual tools for summarizing price-distorting policy trends in a country 
or region (see, e.g., Anderson and Masters 2009) are measures of the unweighted or 
weighted mean nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and consumer tax equivalent (CTE), 
the standard deviation of NRAs, and in a few instances the weighted mean NRA for 
exportable versus import-competing covered products.
1 Authors often need to report 
more than one measure to gain an appreciation of the nature of the policy regime. For 
                                                 
1 The OECD (2009) measures similar indicators to the NRA and CTE, called producer and consumer 
support estimates (PSEs and CSEs). The main difference, apart from the CSE having the opposite sign 
to the CTE, is that the NRA and CTE are expressed as a percentage divergence from undistorted (e.g., 
border) prices whereas the PSEs/CSEs relate to the divergence from actual (distorted) prices. 6 
 
example, indicators of dispersion of NRAs give some idea of the additional welfare 
losses that come from greater variation of NRAs across industries within the sector 
(Lloyd 1974). Further, if import-competing and exportable sub-sectors have NRAs of 
opposite sign, they need to be reported separately because those policies would offset 
each other in calculating the aggregate sectoral NRA.   
While those various indicators are useful as a set, it is often helpful to have a 
single indicator to capture the overall trade or welfare effect of an individual 
country’s regime of agricultural price distortions in place at any time, and to trace its 
path over time and make cross-country comparisons. To that end, the scalar index 
literature is very useful. The pioneering theoretical work is by Anderson and Neary 
(summarized in their 2005 book), with an important partial equilibrium contribution 
by Feenstra (1995). The theory defines an ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied 
uniformly across all tradable agricultural commodities in a country will generate the 
same reduction in trade, or in welfare, as the actual cross-product structure of 
distortions.
2  
In recent years, several empirical papers have provided series of estimates of 
scalar index numbers for individual countries. Irwin (2008) uses detailed tariff data to 
calculate the Anderson–Neary Trade Restrictiveness Index for the United States in 
1859 and annually from 1867 to 1961. Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) estimate 
partial-equilibrium indexes for 78 developing and developed countries for a single 
point in time (mid-2000s). Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) estimate indexes for 
75 developed and developing countries in the World Bank’s recently released 
                                                 
2 Other indices define an ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied uniformly across all tradable 
products, will generate the same government revenue (Bach and Martin 2001), or the same real 
national income and general equilibrium structure of the economy (Anderson 2009a), as the actual 
cross-product structure of distortions. 7 
 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008) over 
the period 1955 to 2007.  
In addition to being useful to summarize the agricultural and food policy 
regime in an individual country, the Anderson-Neary scalar index measures can be 
usefully adapted to summarize two other aspects of agricultural policy: they can be 
computed for individual policy instruments, to show the relative contributions of 
different policy instruments to reductions in trade and welfare (Croser and Anderson 
2010); and they can be computed to measure the trade- and welfare-reducing effects 
of policy in a single global or regional commodity market (Croser, Lloyd and 
Anderson 2009). In this paper we utilise the methodology to estimate all three types 
of indexes. In doing so, we extend the theory and analysis to include nontradables, 
which have not been addressed in previous studies.  
 
Country level trade- and welfare-reduction indexes 
 
To capture distortions imposed by each country’s border and domestic policies on its 
economic welfare and its trade volume, we adopt the methodology from Lloyd, 
Croser and Anderson (2010). Those authors define a Welfare Reduction Index (WRI) 
and a Trade Reduction Index (TRI) and estimate them by considering separately the 
distortions to the producer and consumer sides of the agricultural sector (which can 
differ when there are domestic measures in place in addition to or instead of trade 
measures). As their names suggest, the two indexes respectively capture in a single 
indicator the (partial equilibrium) welfare- or trade-reducing effects of all distortions 
to consumer and producer prices of farm products from all agricultural and food 
policy measures in place. The WRI and TRI thus go somewhat closer to what a 8 
 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) can provide in the way of estimates of the 
trade and welfare (and other) effects of price distortions, while having the advantage 
of providing an annual time series. Fortuitously, estimates of the actual price 
distortions are available in the NRAs and CTEs of the World Bank’s Distortions to 
Agricultural Incentives database.  
The derivation of the two indexes for n import-competing industries leads to 
the expressions for the TRI and WRI for the import-competing sector of a country 
shown in Box 1. 
 
Box 1: Expressions for the TRI and WRI  
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Variable definitions:  
T — Trade Reduction Index; W — Welfare Reduction Index; R — index of average consumer price 
distortions; S —index of average producer price distortions; R′— Consumer Distortion Index; S′— 
Producer Distortion Index; si — the rate of distortion of the producer price in proportional terms; ri  — 
rate of distortion of the consumer price in proportional terms; ui — weight for each commodity in R 
and R’, which is proportional to the marginal response of domestic consumption to changes in 
international free-trade prices and can be written as a function of the domestic price elasticity (at the 9 
 
protected trade situation) of demand ( i ρ ); vi — weight for each commodity in S and S’, which is 
proportional to the marginal response of domestic production to changes in international free-trade 
prices and can be written as a function of the domestic price elasticity (at the protected trade situation) 
of supply, ( i σ ); pi
* — border price;  P
i p  = pi
*(1 + si ) — distorted domestic price; 
C
i p   = pi
*(1 + ri ) — 
distorted domestic consumer price;  ()
C
ii i xx p = — quantity of good i demanded (as a function of own 
domestic price);  ()
P
ii i yy p =  — quantity of good i supplied (as a function of own domestic price); a (b) 
— weight of consumption (production) in the WRI or TRI, which is proportional to the ratio of the 
marginal response of domestic demand (supply) to a price change relative to the marginal response of 
imports to a price change.  
Source: Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010). 
 
Essentially the import-competing TRI and WRI are constructed from 
appropriately weighted averages of the level of distortions of consumer and producer 
prices. The TRI is a mean of order one, and the WRI a mean of order two, but they 
use the same weights. Because the WRI is a mean of order two, it better reflects the 
welfare cost of agricultural price-distorting policies because it recognizes that the 
welfare cost of a government-imposed price distortion is related to the square of the 
price wedge. It thus captures the disproportionately higher welfare costs of peak 
levels of assistance or taxation, and is positive regardless of whether the government’s 
agricultural policy is favouring or hurting farmers.  
The TRI and WRI can each be extended so as to add the exportable and 
nontradable sub-sectors of agriculture (see Appendix). Distortions to exportable 
industries are inputted into the TRI as negative values because a positive (negative) 
price distortion in an exporting industry has a trade-expanding (-reducing) effect, 
and thus decreases (increases) the TRI. Distortions to nontradable industries are 
inputted into the TRI as zero values because a domestic price distortion in a 10 
 
nontradable industry by definition has neither a trade-expanding nor trade-reducing 
effect because of assumed prohibitively high trade costs. This extension of the TRI 
and WRI to include nontradables is a methodological contribution of this paper,
3 
and is of practical significance in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa where 
nontradables account for a non-trivial share of the gross value of agricultural 
production (discussed below).   
The expressions for the TRI and WRI weights above show that estimates of 
price elasticities are required to compute the indexes. In line with Lloyd, Croser and 
Anderson (2010), in the absence of elasticities we adopt some simplifying 
assumptions in this paper. We assume that domestic price elasticities of supply 
(demand) are equal across commodities within a sub-sector. This powerful 
simplifying assumption allows us (in the empirical section below) to find 
appropriately weighted aggregates of distortions on the production and consumption 
sides simply by aggregating the change in consumer (producer) prices across 
commodities and using as weights the sectoral share of each commodity’s domestic 
value of consumption (production) at undistorted prices. We expect this simplifying 
elasticity assumption to have a very small impact on the reported indices. This is 
because elasticities appear in both the numerator and denominator of the weight 
expressions, and therefore cancel each other out to some extent. Further, Kee, Nicita 
and Olarreaga (2009) show that the TRI and WRI can be decomposed into three 
components and the elasticity only enters into one of the three components, which in 
practice is a very small component relative to the other two. This transparent 
assumption also makes sense in the context of computing time series of indices for 
                                                 
3 Anderson and Neary (2005), chapter 12 discusses the possibility of extending indices to nontradable 
sub-sectors and including domestic distortions in their general equilibirum framework. 11 
 
Africa, where there is a dearth of reliable and consistent elasticity estimates across 
time for all our focus countries and their covered agricultural products.    
 
Policy instrument trade and welfare reduction indexes 
 
The above country-level TRI and WRI measures are the aggregate of the trade- and 
welfare-reducing effects of all the policy measures in place. The variables si and ri, as 
domestic-to-border price ratios, can theoretically encompass distortions provided by 
all trade tax/subsidy and trade non-tax/subsidy measures, plus domestic price support 
measures (positive or negative), plus direct interventions affecting farm input prices. 
Furthermore, where multiple exchange rates operate, the measures can encompass an 
estimate of the import or export tax equivalent of that distortionary regime too.   
  Whilst it is desirable to have such an aggregated country level indicator that is 
so encompassing, agricultural policy analysts are sometimes interested in the relative 
contribution of different policy instruments to reductions in trade and welfare. To 
provide this insight, it is possible to use the Anderson-Neary framework to construct 
indicators of policy distortions at the instrument level to facilitate this comparison.
4   
To capture distortions imposed by each African country’s different policy 
instruments on its economic welfare and its trade volume, we adopt the methodology 
from Croser and Anderson (2010). These authors define an Instrument Welfare 
Reduction Index (IWRI) and an Instrument Trade Reduction Index (ITRI), which can 
be estimated by considering the distortion from a single policy instrument to the 
producer and consumer sides of the economy.  
                                                 
4 We note that most of the series of TRI and WRI indicators in the literature are for single instruments 
anyway. For example, Irwin (2008) uses only import tariffs; and Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) 
report two series of indices — one based on tariffs only; and the other on tariffs plus NTBs. However, 
we are unaware of other studies that use the Anderson-Neary framework to directly compare the 
distortionary effects of different instruments on trade and welfare.  12 
 
The methodology in Croser and Anderson (2010) identifies four types of 
border distortions (import taxes and subsidies, and export taxes and subsidies), for 
which individual ITRI and IWRI series can be estimated. In addition to the border 
measures, the series for domestic distortions in the form of production, consumption 
and input taxes and subsidies can be estimated. To estimate the trade-reducing effect 
of an individual instrument, those authors derive expressions for the change in import 
volume from the individual policy measures, which are used as the basis for deriving 
ITRIs. To estimate the welfare-reducing effect of individual instruments, the authors 
make an assumption about the allocation of the total welfare loss from the 
combination of individual policy instruments. The authors assume that border 
measures are applied first, and that this may be supplemented by additional domestic 
distortions. Thus the domestic distortion’s welfare reduction is the residual from 
subtracting the border measures’ effects from the total welfare reduction of all policy 
measures. This allocation assumption provides a lower-bound on welfare losses from 
border measures and an upper-bound on welfare losses from domestic measures.   
The derivation of the ITRI and IWRI follows essentially the same steps as 
those for the country-level indices which encompass all forms of distortion. The 
difference in the algebraic methodology is to specify separate indices for the nine 
different types of policy instrument. Simplifying price elasticity assumptions can be 
made in the absence of reliable estimates, and again these assumptions have a 
minimal effect on the estimates.  
 
Commodity market trade and welfare reduction indices 
 13 
 
In addition to constructing country-level and instrument-specific indices, this paper 
makes use of another methodology within the Anderson-Neary framework to analyse 
a different aspect of agricultural policy in Africa’s poorest nations. We construct 
indices that show the extent to which African markets for individual farm 
commodities are distorted relative to others. We employ the methodology in Croser, 
Lloyd and Anderson (2010) for this purpose. This methodology is novel because 
whereas all previous work within the trade restrictiveness indices literature has 
focused on constructing index numbers of distortions from the perspective of a single 
country, this methodology instead takes a regional view of individual commodity 
markets.  
The commodity TRI (WRI) is equal to the uniform trade tax that has the same 
effect on regional trade volume (welfare) as the existing set of distortions in the 
region’s national commodity markets. The measures are constructed in the same way 
as those for individual country indices, except that instead of summing across 
distortions in different industries for a single country, the measures are constructed by 
summing across distortions in different countries for a single commodity.   
The indices are computed using data on the domestic production and 
consumption sides of the region’s national commodity markets, and the measures 
account for all forms of border and domestic price distortion in each country for the 
commodity market of interest, as well as incorporating import-competing and 
exportable countries into the measure. In the absence of elasticity estimates, we make 
simplifying assumptions analogous to those made for national indexes. Croser, Lloyd 
and Anderson (2010) demonstrate that these assumptions have a minimal impact on 
the estimated series when constructing indices for global markets.  14 
 
 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database 
 
This study makes use of the World Bank’s Distortions to Agricultural Incentives 
database (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). The database came out of a global 
research project seeking to improve the understanding of agricultural policy 
interventions and reforms in Asia, Europe’s transition economies, Latin America 
and the Caribbean as well as Africa. The database contains annual estimates of 
nominal rates of assistance (NRA) (positive or negative) for key farm products in 
75 countries that together account for between 90 and 96 percent of the world’s 
population, farmers, agricultural GDP, and total GDP. There are 21 African 
countries in the database.  
We concentrate on the sample of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries listed in 
the introduction, but exclude relatively affluent Egypt and South Africa which 
together account for between one-third and one-fifth of Africa gross value of 
production at undistorted prices over the period under analysis. For the 19 African 
focus countries, the database contains around 6000 consistent estimates of annual 
NRAs to the agricultural sector and the same number of CTEs between 1955 and 
2005. Country coverage up to 1960 is much less than from 1961, so the series of 
estimates presented in this paper begins in that latter year. 
  The estimates of NRA and CTE in the database are at the commodity level 
and cover a subset of 41 agricultural products in Africa. These so-called covered 
products account for around 70 percent of total agricultural production over the 
period studied. The data identifies each year the extent to which each commodity in 
each country is considered an importable, exportable or nontradable, a status that 15 
 
may change over time. In the 19 African focus countries, nontradable products 
account over time for between 40 and 55 percent of the gross value of production of 
all covered agricultural products (last column of Table 1). 
  The range of policy measures included in the NRA estimates in the 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database is wide. By calculating domestic-to-
border price ratios, the estimates include assistance provided by all tariff and 
nontariff trade measures, plus any domestic price support measures (positive or 
negative), plus an adjustment for the output-price equivalent of direct interventions 
on inputs. Where multiple exchange rates operate, an estimate of the import or 
export tax equivalents of that distortion are included as well. The range of measures 
included in the CTE estimates include both domestic consumer taxes and subsidies 
and trade and exchange rate policies, all of which drive a wedge between the price 
that consumers pay for each commodity and the international price at the border.  
  Anderson and Masters (2009) note several patterns that emerge in the 
distortions to agricultural incentives in the 21 focus countries. In the 1960s and 
1970s, many African governments had macroeconomic, sectoral and trade policies 
that increasingly favoured the urban sector at the expense of farm households and 
favoured production of import-competing farm goods at the expense of exportables. 
The policy regime was characterized as pro-urban (anti-agricultural) and pro-self-
sufficiency (anti-agricultural trade). Since the 1980s, Africa has reduced its anti-
agricultural and anti-trade biases, but many distortions still remain.  
For the 19 countries in this study, Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate those 
patterns. The weighted average NRA for the 19 countries is almost always below 
zero, indicating that together agricultural price, trade and exchange rate policies 
have reduced the earnings of farmers in these countries. The average rate of direct 16 
 
taxation (negative NRA) of African farmers rose until the late 1970s before 
declining by more than half over the next 25 years. Meanwhile, assistance to non-
agricultural sectors rose (thereby making farming less attractive in relative terms) 
and then declined slower than for agriculture, as reflected in the Relative Rate of 
Assistance (RRA) estimates in Table 1.  
Table 2 reports the country-level NRAs for covered products for each of the 
19 countries in this sample. It reveals the considerable diversity within the sample. 
In some countries — such as Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, Uganda, Tanzania, and 
Madagascar — there was a reduction in taxing farmers since the regional peak in 
1975–79, while in other countries — such as and Cote d’Ivoire, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe — high levels of agricultural taxation persist.  
The country level aggregate measures hide the degree of variation in NRA 
estimates within countries. Anderson and Masters (2009) report the standard 
deviations around the weighted mean NRA for covered products in each country, 
showing that the variation is significant. An indication of the extent of variation 
between groups of products is seen when comparing the average NRAs for import-
competing and exportable product groups, which reflects the antitrade bias 
(Figure 1).  
Notwithstanding the valuable contribution of the measures reported in 
Anderson and Masters (2009), sectoral averages of NRAs and RRAs can be 
misleading as indicators of the aggregate extent of price distortion within the sector. 
They can also be misleading when compared across countries that have varying 
degrees of dispersion in their NRAs (and CTEs) for farm products. We therefore now 
turn to consideration of the TRI and WRI series estimated for this paper, and the 
additional insights these measures can provide.  17 
 
 
Trade and welfare reduction index estimates 
 
The regional aggregate TRI for the 19 African focus countries for all covered 
products is positive and of a significant magnitude over the period under analysis 
(Figure 2). The positive TRI indicates that overall agricultural policy in African 
countries resulted in reduced trade. The extent of that has decreased over time, 
however, with the five-year TRI averages of between 20 and 25 percent in the first 
two decades of data falling to around 10 percent in the most recent decade. The TRI 
has the opposite sign to the NRA because the TRI correctly aggregates policies that 
reduce trade volume, regardless of whether the NRA is positive or negative. The 
importance of the difference in these aggregations of the trade-reducing effect of 
policies can be seen in the early-1960s, for example, when the average NRA was 
around zero but the TRI was quite high (capturing the trade-reducing effect of both 
import taxes and export taxes, which offset one another in the NRA estimate). 
Similarly in the late 1980s, the NRA trends from around -15 to -10 percent at a time 
when the TRI increases from 20 to 30 percent. The aggregate NRA gives the 
impression that policies are becoming less distorted in this period but, because the 
upward trend in the NRA is caused by an increase in import taxes, the TRI correctly 
reveals that agricultural policies are in fact becoming more restrictive in this time 
period.  
  The WRI series for all covered products is necessarily positive and 
everywhere lies above the TRI series (Figure 2). The WRI series correctly 
demonstrates the negative welfare consequences that flow from both negative and 
positive price distortions. Furthermore, the WRI series provides a better indicator of 18 
 
the welfare cost of distortions than the average level of assistance or taxation, due to 
the inclusion in the WRI of the ‘power of two’. A weighted arithmetic mean does not 
fully reflect the welfare effects of agricultural distortions because the dispersion of 
that support or taxation across products has been ignored. By contrast, the WRI 
captures the higher welfare costs of high and peak levels of assistance or taxation. 
That is, the WRI reflects the disparity issue discussed in Lloyd (1974): the larger the 
variance in assistance levels, the greater the potential for resources to be used in 
activities which do not maximize economic welfare.     
  The aggregate African results mask country-level diversity in the TRI and 
WRI series. Some countries — such as Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe — persistently restrict trade (in aggregate) throughout the period under 
analysis (Table 3). Other countries — such as Kenya, Zambia and Mozambique — 
have had periods in which policies in aggregate have expanded agricultural trade 
slightly. In terms of the WRI, there is less diversity across countries, since WRI 
measures are all necessarily positive (Table 4). The extent to which agricultural policy 
reduced aggregate welfare does differ across countries, however. Some countries have 
low reductions in welfare, including Uganda and most cotton-exporting countries. 
Figure 3 provides a snapshot for 2000–04 of the diversity in the WRI and TRI for 
each of the 19 countries, with the weighted African average in the middle.  
  A useful way of understanding the overall welfare reduction for Africa from 
agricultural policy is to compute the country contributions to the WRI for the 19 
African focus countries as a whole. Contributions can be found by computing dollar 
values of the welfare reduction for each country (by multiplying the WRI percent by 
the average of the gross value of production and consumption at undistorted prices). 
Such contributions will therefore take account of the magnitude of national WRIs as 19 
 
well as the significance of each country in terms of its share of the gross value of 
production and consumption at undistorted prices. Table 5 shows that Nigeria and 
Sudan are the two countries that dominate the region’s contributions, with Sudan 
becoming more important over time (as its WRI series trends upwards). Ethiopia 
accounts for up to 10 percent of the focus region’s welfare reduction. The last column 
of Table 5 reports country contributions to the decline in the regional WRI from its 
value of 44 percent in 1975–79 to its value of 27 percent in 2000–04. Once again, 
Nigeria and Sudan dominate the overall reduction, together accounting for around 80 
percent of the fall in the WRI. However, Uganda, Cameroon, Senegal and 
Madagascar have a slightly offsetting effect on the regional fall in the WRI over that 
period.  
  Figure 4(a) shows commodity contributions to the regional WRI and TRI. In 
line with the significance of nontradables in the focus countries, the products cassava, 
and yam dominate the contribution to the overall WRI. Cassava and yam both have 
average NRAs close to zero in all time periods (five year averages between -4 and 0 
percent over the period studied) and are nontraded for most countries. The next 
contributor is maize, which on average has high levels of assistance in several import-
competing focus countries – and significant negative levels of protection in exporting 
countries. None of the livestock products in the focus countries contribute 
significantly to the WRI for all covered products, because their share in regional gross 
value of production of covered products is low.  
It is useful to compare the TRI and WRI series reported above for all covered 
products, with those for just covered tradables in Africa.
5 In Table 6, it can be seen 
that the TRI and WRI for all covered products is significantly lower than that for 
                                                 
5 Note that Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) report measures for covered tradables only.  20 
 
covered tradables. This is because, as noted above, nontradables account for a large 
share of the gross value of production and consumption. The TRI estimates for all 
covered products are roughly half, and WRI estimates are roughly two-thirds, what 
there were with nontradables included. Figure 4(b) shows that commodity 
contributions to the regional WRI are substantially different when considering only 
tradables. Beef and groundnut make the largest contributions to the reduction in 
regional welfare when considering only tradables.  
  Another point to note from Table 6 is that the country sample matters for the 
reporting of TRI and WRI results. For comparison, we report the results from Lloyd, 
Croser and Anderson (2010), which computed TRI and WRI series for an alternative 
sample of African countries in the Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database. 
Their sample is the same 19 countries in this paper, with the addition of Egypt and 
South Africa, and excluding the five cotton countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Mali and Togo, because these countries only have one covered tradable product 
(cotton). In general, the 19 focus countries in this study have higher TRI and WRI 
5-year averages. This is driven by the exclusion of Egypt and South Africa, which had 
low country-level TRI and WRI estimates. The exception to the general pattern is the 
time period 1985–89, where the Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) estimates are 
higher, owing to very high protection in Egypt in that five-year average period (when 
international food prices collapsed just as Egypt raised its previously very low 
domestic food prices).  
  It is also useful to compare the TRI and WRI results for the 19 focus countries 
to the TRI and WRI estimates for other developing country regions, which are 
reported in Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010). The 19 African focus countries had 
the most welfare reducing policies over time, and generally the most trade-distorting. 21 
 
All three regions have shown a trend towards less trade and welfare reducing 
agricultural policies in recent years, however (Figure 5).  
  
Policy instrument results  
 
We now turn to the national decompositions of the TRI and WRI to the policy 
instrument level. Figure 6 provides a summary of the estimates of the contribution to 
the weighted average WRI series for the 19 African focus countries of four different 
border measures: taxes and subsidies on both imports and exports. The figure 
demonstrates the very substantial role that export taxes have played in the reduction 
of welfare in the region. On average, more than half the welfare reductions have come 
from anti-agricultural export taxing policies over the period studied. Notwithstanding 
their significant distortionary contribution, export taxes have also been the area in 
which there has been most reform in recent decades. The contribution of export taxes 
to the reduction in the WRI over the period 1985–89 to 2000–04 is 93 percent. Import 
taxes reduced the overall WRI by 34 percent; while there were offsetting increases in 
the contribution of export subsidies (13 percent) and import subsidies (15 percent) to 
the WRI. The contributions to TRI and WRI estimates for the 19 African countries 
from domestic distortions are small, never accounting for more than 2 percent of the 
overall regional TRI or WRI.  
 
Commodity TRI and WRI results 
 
The TRI and WRI estimates for individual regional commodity markets provide a 
different perspective on the level of distortion in the 19 focus countries over the 22 
 
period under analysis. Table 7 reports the five-year average WRI estimates for the 
focus region for individual commodity markets. The table reveals considerable 
diversity in the distortions in different commodity markets. Fruit and vegetable 
commodity markets, which tend to have a high share of nontradable production, have 
low WRI estimates on average, whereas traded commodities such as tropical crops, 
oilseeds and livestock tend to have more welfare-reducing policies in place. Grains, 
which comprise a mixture of tradable and nontradable products, had highly-
distortionary policies in place in the 1960s on average, but these have been reduced 
over time.  
  Figure 7 gives a snapshot of the diversity across commodity markets in the 
regional TRI and WRI for 2000–04. Sugar and cotton markets continue to have highly 
distorted policies in terms of both the trade and welfare effects of policies. Soybean, 
by contrast, has trade-expanding policies in aggregate, but the policies are 
nevertheless welfare reducing.  
 
Conclusions, caveats and areas for further research 
 
Reform of agricultural policy in Africa is topical at present. Recently announced 
international investment programs, domestic policy reforms, and the negotiation of 
international and regional trade agreements are on the agenda. To assess each of these 
policy initiatives, measurement of intervention levels is required. Certainly, economy-
wide models can measure the welfare and trade (and other) effects of policy in a 
particular country or market. But such models require reliable data on the structure of 
the economy, and econometric estimates of myriad parameters, neither of which can 
be easily found for the poorer countries of Africa. Even where economy-wide models 23 
 
are available, they may be calibrated to a particular year and so incapable of providing 
a long time-series of estimates of the regional effect of distortional policies over time.  
Scalar index measures, by contrast, can meaningfully summarize the welfare 
and trade effects of policy intervention in agriculture in poorer countries. These 
indices can be estimated using already available price, quantity and distortions data, 
and so are relatively inexpensive to generate. We demonstrate this for a subset of 19 
African countries from the World Bank’s recently released Distortions to Agricultural 
Incentives database.  
The estimates in the paper reveal several important findings. The national 
level TRIs and WRIs indicate that although there has been policy reform in African 
agriculture over the past 50 years, the overall trade- and welfare-reducing effects of 
current policies remain significant. Export taxes in particular continue to reduce 
African welfare and trade. Some individual commodity markets in Africa are more 
distorted than others, sugar and cotton being two of the most distorted.  
  The scalar index numbers reported in this paper provide a better measure of 
policy intervention than widely-used NRA-type measures because they correctly 
aggregate offsetting policies and the WRI captures the higher welfare costs of more 
disparate policies across industries. These scalar measures have the advantage of 
making policies more transparent, which can facilitate further reforms.  
Notwithstanding their contribution, there are a number of limitations to the 
indices. Some are empirical. First, the estimates can only take account of agricultural 
products which have commodity level data in the World Bank’s database. The 
database has product level data for approximately 70 percent of the 19 African focus 
countries’ farm production value, and somewhat less of their consumption value. We, 
therefore, necessarily miss some information about distortions to production and 24 
 
consumption and therefore trade and welfare in Africa. Furthermore, the data in the 
World Bank’s database are not highly disaggregated, which is not ideal for capturing 
the full extent of welfare and trade distortions from African policies. Finally, in the 
absence of reliable, consistently estimated time-series of elasticities of demand and 
supply, we make simplifying assumptions about those elasticities to compute the 
scalar index number series. The estimates would be more precise if we had access to 
reliable elasticity estimates, although probably not a lot different, according to 
sensitivity analysis conducted by Croser, Lloyd and Anderson (2010).  
There are also some methodological caveats worth noting. The methodology 
in the paper adopts the standard approach still presented in most textbooks on trade 
policy or welfare economics, based on the benchmark of competitive markets. The 
methodology ignores the existence of divergences and governance problems, 
including administrative costs. Thus the trade and welfare reduction indexes reported 
above may be over- or under-stated to the extent that such problems exist. For 
example, in some cases where there is market failure, we know from second-best 
theory that policies that increase assistance to a lightly protected industry may 
increase rather than decrease national economic welfare. These neoclassical 
assumptions we make are unlikely to be realistic for many of the poorest nations in 
Africa. In particular, the RRA measure reported in Table 1 suggest that distortions to 
non-farm tradables sectors in Africa exist. Even so, the series reported in this paper 
are useful aggregations of data and almost certainly give a better indication of trade 
and welfare effects of policy than average NRA-type measures.   
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Appendix: Derivation of Trade- and Welfare-Reduction Indexes 
 
 
Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) outline a methodology for computing indices 
which accurately capture the state of trade policy regime in an individual country in 
a theoretically meaningful way. Their methodology, which draws heavily on the 
Anderson and Neary (2005) methodology, defines partial equilibrium indexes 
which aggregate the production and consumption sides of the economy separately 
(instead of trade data as is more commonly done with trade restrictiveness indexes). 
This form of index is well-suited to agricultural distortions research, where data is 
available for production and consumption of individual farm commodities. This 
Appendix briefly outlines that theory for the import-competing sector of a small 
open economy.  
Start by considering an individual country, assuming it has a small, open 
economy in which all markets are competitive. The market for an import good may 
be distorted by a tariff and other nontariff border measures or by behind-the-border 
measures such as domestic subsidies and price controls.The first measure of interest 
is the effect of a country’s distortions on its import volume, the TRI. This is defined 
as the uniform tariff rate which, if applied to all goods in the place of all actual 
border and behind-the-border price distortions, would result in the same reduction 
in the volume of imports (summed across products by valuing them at the 
undistorted border price) as the actual distortions. 
Consider the market for one good, good i, which is distorted by a 
combination of measures that distort its consumer and producer prices. For the 
producers of the good, the distorted domestic producer price, 
P
i p , is related to the 29 
 
border price, pi
*, by the relation, 
P
i p  = pi
*(1 + si ) where si is the rate of distortion of 
the producer price in proportional terms. For the consumers of the good, the 
distorted domestic consumer price, 
C
i p , is related to the border price by the relation, 
C
i p   = pi
*(1 + ri ) where ri is the rate of distortion of the consumer price in 
proportional terms. In general, ri ≠ si . Using these relations, the change in the value 
of imports in the market for good i is given by:  
  i i i i i y p x p M ∆ − ∆ = ∆
* *  
 
                *2 *2 //
CP
ii i ii i ii p dx d r p dy d s p p =−
       (1)
 
where the quantities of good i demanded and supplied,  i x and  i y , are functions just 
of their own domestic price:  ()
C
ii i xx p = and  ()
P
ii i yy p = .  
Strictly speaking, this result holds only for small distortions. In reality rates 
of distortion may not be small. If, however, the demand and supply functions are 
linear over the relevant price range, the effect on imports is given by equation (1) 
with constant slopes of the demand and supply curves (
C
i i dp dx /  and 
P
i i dp dy /,  
respectively). If the functions are not linear, this expression provides an 
approximation to the loss.   
With n importable goods subject to different levels of distortions, the 
aggregate reduction in imports, in the absence of cross-price effects in all markets, 
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Solving for T, give 30 
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Evidently, the uniform tariff T can be written as a weighted average of the 
level of distortions of consumer and producer prices (R  and S are indices of 
average consumer and producer price distortions; they are arithmetic means). An 
important advantage of using this decomposition of the index into producer and 
consumer effects is that it treats correctly the effects of NTMs and domestic 
distortions that affect the two sides of the market differently.   
In equation 3c (equation 3b), the weights for each commodity are 
proportional to the marginal response of domestic production (consumption) to 
changes in international free-trade prices. These weights can be written as, among 
other things, functions of the domestic price elasticities (at the protected trade 
situation) of supply and demand ( i σ  and  i ρ , respectively):
6  
  ∑ =
n
i
i i i i i i i x p x p u ) ( / ) (
* * ρ ρ    and   ∑ =
n
i
i i i i i i i y p y p v ) ( / ) (




The other index defined in Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010), the WRI, 
measures the effect of a country’s distortions on its economic welfare. The 
derivation follows the same steps as in the derivation of the TRI except that instead 
of starting from the loss in trade volume from a policy, one starts from a loss of 
consumer and producer surplus (a welfare loss,  i L ). With n importable goods 
                                                 
6 These expressions can also be written as functions of, among other things, the domestic price 
elasticities at the free trade points. 31 
 
subject to different levels of distortions, the aggregate welfare loss, in the absence 
of cross-price effects in all markets, is given by:  
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The uniform tariff rate, W, that generates an aggregate deadweight loss 
identical with that of the differentiated set of tariffs is determined by the following 
equation:  
*2 *2 * 2
11 1
 ( ) dy /d ( ) dx /d ( ) d /d
nn n PC
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W is thus the uniform tariff which, if applied to all goods in the place of all 
actual tariffs and NTMs and other distortions, would result in the same aggregate 
loss of welfare as the actual distortions. Solving for W, we have:  
 





















′= ∑                                (7c) 
with ui, vi, a and b as defined for equation 3 above. W is the desired Welfare 
Reduction Index, whileR′ and S′are the contributions to W from consumer and 
producer price distortions, respectively. They, like their appropriately weighted 
average W, are means of order two. As with the index T, we can deal with, and 
analyse, the production and consumption sides of the sector separately.  
 
Extension to exportable sectors  
 
Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) report how the indexes can each be extended to 
include the exportables sub-sector. This is facilitated by way of aggregating the 32 
 
import-competing and exportables sub-indices where the weights for each sub-
sector are the share of the sub-sectors’ value of production (consumption) in the 
total value of production (consumption). The resulting measure is the import 
tax/export subsidy which, if applied uniformly to all products in the sector, would 
give the same loss of welfare as the combination of measures distorting consumer 
and producer prices in the import-competing and exportable sub-sectors. 
The only trick in the case of the TRI is to keep separate track of the subsets 
of import-competing and exportable goods because the sign of an NRA in 
exportable sector (positive or negative) has the opposite effect on the TRI. That is, 
while an export subsidy in the exportable sub-sector reduces welfare in the same 
way as an import tax in the import-competing sub-sector, the export subsidy will 
increase trade and the import tariff reduces trade.  
 
Extension to nontradables sectors 
 
In this paper we make a further methodological extension to the theory. We extend 
indices to include nontradable, as well as tradable sectors. This is important for 
Africa, because in many countries the share of nontradables in the gorss value of 
agricultural production is high. Becasue nontradables are generally free of 
distortions, an index that does not take into account these sectors will tend to 
overstate the trade- and welfare-reducing effect of agricultural policy.  
To include nontradables, we keep separate track of three subsectors of the 
economy: import-competing, exportable and nontradable sub-sectors. We generate 
sub-sector specific TRI and WRI indices (as we previously did for each of the 
import-competing and exportable subsectors). The three sub-sector indices are then 33 
 
aggregated using as weights each sub-sectors’ share of value of production 
(consumption) in the total value of production (consumption). 
For the WRI, because distortions in nontradable secotrs cause welfare 
distortions, we proceed as expected and si and ri values in equations 7b and 7c are 
the actual level of distortion in the nontradable sectors.  
For the TRI, however, we make an asusumption that si and ri values in 
equations 3b and 3b are zero. This assumption is such that distortions to 
nontradable products are assumed not to expand or reduce trade volume. The 
assumption recognises the high trade costs in these products. si and ri values). This 
is the case for the vast majority of non-tradable products in any case. It means that 
the contribution of nontradables to TRI is only through the share of nontradables in 
value of production (consumption) in the total value of production (consumption). 
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Figure 1: Nominal Rates of Assistance for import-competing, exportable and all 
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Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
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Figure 2: Trade and Welfare Reduction Indices, and Nominal Rate of Assistance for 
























Figure 3: Trade and Welfare Reduction Indices, all covered products, 19 African 
















Source: Anderson and Croser (2009) based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) 
a. To get the regional average the national indexes are weighted by the average of the 
gross value of production and consumption at undistorted prices.  37 
 
Figure 4: Product contributions
a to the regional Welfare Reduction Index for 19 
African countries, 1961–64 to 2000–04 
(percent) 

























































Source: Anderson and Croser (2009) based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) 
a. Products which contribute less than 1 percent to the WRI dollar amount in 2000–04 
are omitted from the charts.  38 
 
Figure 5: Trade- and Welfare-Reduction Indices, 19 African focus countries, Asia and 
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Source: Modified from Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) using Anderson and 
Croser (2009), which is based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008) 
a. 1960–64 is 1961–64 for Sub-Saharan African countries.    39
Figure 6: Decomposition of the Welfare Reduction Index
a due to border measures, by 
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Source: Croser and Anderson (2010) based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008)   40















Source: Anderson and Croser (2009) based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
a. Products with a WRI of less than 30 percent in 2000–04 are omitted from the chart; and camel — which has the highest WRI in 2000–04 — is 
also omitted.   41
Table 1: Summary of Nominal Rates of Assistance for import-competing, exportable, nontradable, and all covered agricultural products, 




 NRA,  agricultural  products



















share (%) of 
value of all 
covered agric. 
production 
1961-64 -30  123  3  0 -1  34  5  49 
1965-69 -39 62  -15  0  -11  33  -12  55 
1970-74 -47 30  -27  0  -17  31  -19  55 
1975-79 -52 22  -30  -1  -23  37  -27  54 
1980-84 -47  4  -28  -1  -18  35  -17  46 
1985-89 -50 49  -26  -2  -15  33  -22  46 
1990-94 -49  5  -27  -2  -16  31  -19  41 
1995-99 -32  3  -15  -3  -10  25  -11  39 
2000-04 -32  7  -16  -3  -10  26  -18  43 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
 
a. Nominal rates of assistance for the 19 African focus countries are weighted by the gross value of production at undistorted prices for the 
relevant sub-sector.  
b. The simple average of the 19 focus countries’ standard deviation of NRA around its weighted mean.  




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. The regional RRA is a weighted average of national RRAs, with weights 
being the gross value of production at undistorted prices for all agriculture.    42
Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance, all covered products, 19 African focus countries, 




   1961–64 1965–69 1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 
 
2000–04 
Africa  -1 -11 -17 -23 -18 -15 -16 -10 -10 
Benin  na na -3 -1 -1 -1 -4 -4 -1 
Burkina  Faso  na na -2 -3 -4 -1 -3 -3  0 
Cameroon  -4 -8  -12  -25  -19 -5 -4 -4 -1 
Chad  na na  -12  -11 -8 -1 -3 -3 -1 
Côte  d'Ivoire  -29 -35 -33 -40 -40 -28 -22 -22 -28 
Ethiopia  na  na  na  na -12 -15 -17 -10  -7 
Ghana  -15 -28 -23 -41 -32  -8  -3  -5  -2 
Kenya  13  -2 -24 -15 -30  -8 -30  -4  4 
Madagascar  -19 -23 -20 -38 -51 -26  -7  -4  2 
Mali  na na -6 -8 -7 -3 -5 -7  0 
Mozambique  na  na  na -56 -42 -51  -4  5  14 
Nigeria  21  12 7 5 8  15 4 0  -5 
Senegal  -15 -12 -33 -34 -30  5  7 -10 -12 
Sudan  -26 -37 -48 -28 -33 -39 -54 -29 -15 
Tanzania  na  na  na -50 -60 -52 -30 -29 -17 
Togo  na na -1 -1 -2 -2 -4 -3 -1 
Uganda  -3  -5 -12 -24 -12 -14  -1  1  1 
Zambia  -24 -32 -42 -57 -26 -68 -53 -34 -36 
Zimbabwe  -36 -36 -44 -54 -47 -43 -45 -38 -73 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
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Table 3: Trade Reduction Index, all covered products
a, 19 African focus countries, 
1961–64 to 2000–04 
(percent) 
 
   1961–64 1965–69 1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 
 
2000–04 
Africa  24 22 20 21 15 24 14  9 10 
Benin  na  na 2 1 1 0 2 3 1 
Burkina  Faso  na  na 2 3 4 1 3 3 0 
Cameroon  2 5 6  14  12 3 2 2 1 
Chad  na  na  12  11 8 1 3 3 1 
Côte  d'Ivoire  13 13 24 27 19 17 12 15 22 
Ethiopia  na na na na 14 16 19 11  9 
Ghana  6 11 10 22 20 15  7  3  7 
Kenya  -16  -19 -4 12 21 19 -7  9 11 
Madagascar  20  15  -13 6  -1  17 3 3 8 
Mali  na  na 4 7 6 3 5 7 0 
Mozambique  na  na  na  27  -6  -14 1 6  24 
Nigeria  39 38 31 18 11 19  7  8  1 
Senegal  14 10 30 36 28 25 26  7 12 
Sudan  29 28 29 29 22 56 40 17 31 
Tanzania  na na na 16 18 34 30 16 17 
Togo  na  na 0 1 2 1 4 3 1 
Uganda  2 4 8  14 9  10 2 2 1 
Zambia  21  1  1  36 -11 -45 -27  -7  29 
Zimbabwe  33 38 43 51 29 37 19 10 12 
 
Source: Anderson and Croser (2009) based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 
 
a. Includes all import-competing, exportable and nontradable products; with 
nontradable sectors assumed to have a zero level of distortion on the volume of trade.  
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Table 4: Welfare Reduction Index, all covered products, 19 African focus countries, 
1961–64 to 2000–04 
(percent) 
 
   1961–64 1965–69 1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 
 
2000–04 
Africa  49 46 45 44 39 45 40 28 27 
Benin  na  na 9 6 7 4 8 7 4 
Burkina  Faso  na  na 9  13  14 5 9 9 9 
Cameroon  9 14 17 29 22 12 11 10  4 
Chad  na na 24 23 20  5  9  8  6 
Côte  d'Ivoire  28 36 36 40 38 30 25 25 31 
Ethiopia  na na na na 22 24 27 20 16 
Ghana  17 30 28 44 49 36 17 11 15 
Kenya  35 39 29 34 38 28 35 26 29 
Madagascar  23 27 26 43 55 37 21 11 13 
Mali  na na 16 20 18  8 13 14  9 
Mozambique  na na na 63 52 63 18 18 41 
Nigeria  87 78 68 54 45 63 48 36 31 
Senegal  17 15 38 41 36 50 55 11 16 
Sudan  36 40 51 40 40 65 79 42 44 
Tanzania  na na na 58 65 62 53 46 38 
Togo  na  na 4 5 9 5  10 8 5 
Uganda  6 9  20  35  24  24 4 4 4 
Zambia  26 41 47 57 31 69 58 39 42 
Zimbabwe  39 45 50 56 46 42 46 40 72 
 
Source: Anderson and Croser (2009) based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 
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Table 5: Country contributions to the regional Welfare Reduction Index for 19 African focus countries, all covered products, 1961–64 to 2000–04 and 
country contributions to the fall in the Welfare Reduction Index for all 19 countries from 1975–79 to 2000–04 
 (percent) 
  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04     
Africa  WRI  49 46 45 44 39 45 40 28 27   
Contribution to fall 
in WRI 1975–79 to 
2000–04
c 
Benin  - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 
Burkina  Faso  - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 
Cameroon  2 3 3 4 2 1 1 1 0    -4 
Chad  - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 
Cote  d’Ivoire  3 5 5 8 6 4 4 4 5    1 
Ethiopia  -  -  -  - 10 11 10 11  9    na 
Ghana  2 4 3 4 4 3 2 2 3    1 
Kenya  2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2    1 
Madagascar  1 2 3 3 4 2 1 1 1    -2 
Mali  - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 
Mozambique  - - - 2 2 1 1 1 2    2 
Nigeria  74 60 51 36 37 37 38 45 35    34 
Senegal  1 1 2 3 2 2 2 0 1    -3 
Sudan  10 15 21 15 18 27 30 19 27    44 
Tanzania  - - - 9 7 4 3 6 6    1 
Togo  - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 
Uganda  1 2 4 7 4 2 0 1 1    -8 
Zambia  1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2    1 
Zimbabwe  3 4 4 4 3 2 3 3 5    7 
Africa
b  100 100 100 102 103 100 100 100 100      100 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data in Anderson and Croser (2009) based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).   46
a.  Country contributions are computed by converting national percentage WRIs to dollar values by multiplying by the average of the gross value of 
production and consumption at undistorted prices. The country contributions therefore capture both the magnitude of the WRI and the share of a country’s 
gross value of production and consumption in the regional value of production and consumption.  
b.  The total for all countries does not necessarily sum to 100 for five-year averages, but it does sum to 100 for individual years. 
c.  This column gives the country contribution to the fall in the WRI from 1975–79 to 2000–04. 
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Table 6: Trade and Welfare Reduction Indexes, all covered products and all tradables, 19 African focus countries and 16 African focus countries, 
1961–64 to 2000–04 
(percent) 
 
    1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
19 Africa focus countries 
T r a d e   R e d u c t i o n   I n d e x e s            
      Covered  tradables  49 40 39 39 27 49 29 17 20 
      All  covered  products  24 22 20 21 15 24 14  9 10 
Welfare Reduction Indexes 
      Covered  tradables  68 61 61 58 54 68 67 45 45 
      All  covered  products  49 46 45 44 39 45 40 28 27 
           
16 African focus countries
a           
      TRI,  Covered  tradables  21 22 21 26 18 50 18 14 14 
      WRI,  Covered  tradables  51 51 52 49 50 80 52 37 36 
 
Source: Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) and Anderson and Croser (2009) based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a. 1961–64 results are for 1960–64 for 16 African focus countries. The 16 African focus country results are those reported in Lloyd, Croser and 
Anderson (2010). The 16 countries are those in this study including Egypt and South Africa, and excluding the five cotton countries — Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Togo. 
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Table 7: Commodity Welfare Reduction Index, African regional market of 19 focus 
countries, 31 covered products, 1961–64 to 2000–04 
(percent) 
  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Grains  59 50 44 34 28 33 26 20 18 
Cassava  0 0 1 1 3 1 1 4 3 
Maize  114 73 63 71 54 67 40 38 35 
Millet  18 18 11  5 10 13 16 18  8 
Rice  31 30 40 36 48 60 38 16 18 
Sorghum  153  144  118 95 83 95 80 52 49 
Wheat  17 37 40 30 14 16 35 16 16 
           
Oilseeds  28 42 54 49 47 40 72 43 36 
Cashew  na na na 80 80 85 61 13 11 
Groundnut  27 43 54 51 50 35 60 41 47 
Oilseed  na na na na 47 52 61 56 42 
Palmoil  25 31 45 26 28 44  132 50 13 
Sesame  50 60 62 65 56 44 47 45 38 
Soybean  na 14 34 44 45 44 56 52 64 
Sunflower  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
           
Tropical  crops  36 41 45 61 54 49 53 44 51 
Cocoa  31 51 46 62 54 41 37 37 38 
Coffee  39 41 46 64 56 48 47 35 21 
Cotton  42 35 44 57 59 59 71 59 64 
Sugar  22 35 47 49 43 38 45 45 87 
Tea  12  8 24 56 52 47 51 50 49 
Tobacco  39 38 48 56 50 50 40 39 58 
           
Fruit  &  vegetables  0 0 0 4 5 5 2 5 5 
Banana  2 4 0 2 2 1 5 5 2 
Bean  7 10  3 48 62 73 35 42 40 
Roots  &  tubers  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pepper  na 42  9 39 47 80 30 62 27 
Plantain  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Potato  na  na  na 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweet  potato  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yam  0 0 0 1 2 1 1 4 4 
           
Livestock  30 36 52 35 33 68 66 40 38 
Beef  34 42 58 29 29 60 73 43 42 
Camel  38 60 34 38 34 68 84 49 99 
Milk  19 16 41 36 29 79 40 30 29 
Sheepmeat  42 48 61 46 38 59 70 54 33 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRA and CTE data in Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008). 
 